How evolution favors cooperation is a fundamental issue in social and economic systems. By incorporating multiple learning mechanisms in project selection into the threshold public goods game, we have investigated the coupling effect of mutation and imitation on the evolution of cooperation. Compared with the situation where there is no project selection mechanism, the existence of project selection may suppress or promote cooperation depending upon different learning mechanisms. There exists a critical ratio between the imitators and the mutants in the population, below which cooperation is suppressed while above which cooperation is promoted. With the coevolutionary mechanism of individual strategies and individual preferences, a higher level of cooperation corresponds to a larger scale of projects. A theoretical analysis indicates that, as most of the individuals are mutants, the coevolutionary mechanism is governed by the mutation process, which leads to a lower level of cooperation. As most of the individuals are imitators, the coevolutionary mechanism is governed by the coupling of the mutation process and the imitation process, which leads to a higher level of cooperation. As all the individuals are imitators, the coevolutionary mechanism is governed by the imitation process, which leads to an intermediate level of cooperation.
Introduction
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated and selfish individuals is a fundamental and fascinating issue in economical, social and biological systems [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] . In the last two decades, based on the models of the prisoner's dilemma, the snowdrift game and the public goods game, tremendous efforts have been dedicated to the exploration of the conditions for the occurrence of mutually beneficial interactions, among which the mechanisms of reputation, penalization and non-participation have been extensively investigated [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] .
The public goods game describes such a scenario where each individual in a group has the opportunity to make a contribution to a common pool or not [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] . All the contributions in the common pool are multiplied by a factor r and divided equally among all the group members irrespective of whether an individual has contributed to the common pool or not. Because only the cooperators bear the burden of contributions, the replicator dynamics in such a game model is in favor of the defectors and the cooperators eventually become extinct.
Some social and economic experiments on public goods problems have shown that imposing fines on exploiters can facilitate cooperation [26, 27, 28] . However, other experiments have shown that, accompanied by the implementation of costly punishment, the second-order or third-order free-rider problems emerge accordingly [29, 30, 31, 32] . These free-rider problems ultimately increase the costs of imposing penalties and cause the collapse of cooperation.
Different from the frequently discussed punishment mechanisms where the punishers have to face severe retaliations from the punished, in real society, there exists a kind of scenario, called gain all-or-nothing activity, where the free-rider problems may be effectively avoided [33, 34] . For exam-ple, moving a huge boulder in the way needs sufficient contributions from all the group members, or else, no one has the opportunity to go through the blocked mountain road. Predator hunting needs sufficient supporters to form a pincer-like encirclement, or else, no one has the opportunity to have a hearty meal. Facing a gain all-or-nothing scenario, only when there exist enough contributors will a good aim become a reality. Although similar problems like the role of start-up costs or critical mass in the evolution of cooperation have been discussed [35, 36] , whether or not a higher level of cooperation can be reached through an active selection of a gain all-or-nothing scenario by the competing individuals is still an open problem [37, 38] .
In the real world, people's activities are subject to constraints to a certain degree. For example, competing for a large project needs a certain amount of support. The company with limited support has to take the second best, which may lead to a decline in earnings. In such a case, the cooperation keeps at a lower level and taking the second best becomes a last resort, which leads to another issue about whether project selection is detrimental to cooperation or not [39, 40] .
In the present work, we incorporate project selection mechanisms into the threshold public goods game. The effects of multiple learning mechanisms on the evolution of cooperation have been investigated. The following are our main findings.
(1)The project selection mechanism is not always beneficial for cooperation. Compared with the situation where there is no project selection mechanism, the existence of imitation mechanism is beneficial for cooperation while the existence of mutation mechanism is detrimental to cooperation.
(2)The coupling effects of multiple learning mechanisms on the evolution of cooperation depend upon the ratio between the imitators and the mutants in the population. There exists a critical ratio between the imitators and the mutants, below which cooperation is suppressed while above which cooperation is promoted. A higher level of cooperation corresponds to a larger scale of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators.
(3)A theoretical analysis indicates that a higher level of cooperation results from the optimum matching between the group size and the project scale. The multiple learning mechanisms are more advantageous for an individual to find the most appropriate project, which finally makes the system reach the highest level of cooperation.
The model
In the public goods game with project selection, each individual has to decide which project he should choose and which strategy, cooperation of defection, he should adopt.
Before the process of project selection and the process of strategy selection, each individual i firstly makes a judgement on whether the project can be finished or not. If there are enough cooperators in the group, that is, n c C max I ≥ S, in which n c is the number of cooperators in the group, C max I is an individual's maximal contribution and S is the needed contribution for the group members to finish the task, the project can be finished. Or else, the project can not be finished. On condition that the project can be finished, a cooperator gets a payoff P C = rS n − S nc and a defector gets a payoff P D = rS n , in which r is the multiplication factor. On condition that the project can not be finished, that is, n c C max I < S, a cooperator and a defector get their payoffs P C = P D = 0.
In the process of project selection, an individual i firstly makes a decision on whether he should modify his project or not. If his payoff P i in the latest step is less than the average payoff of the populationP , he modifies his project. Or else, he keeps his project. There exist two kinds of individuals: called mutant and imitator respectively. A mutant i modifies his project S 0 i in the following way: he randomly chooses a new project S i within the range of
An imitator i modifies his project S 0 i in the following way: he firstly finds out an individual j with the highest payoff P j . Then he replaces his project with individual j's project, S i = S 0 j . In the process of strategy selection, an individual i firstly selects an individual j randomly. If individual i's strategy is different from individual j's, individual i adopts individual j's strategy with probability ω,
in which P i is individual i's payoff, P j is individual j's payoff, τ = κ = 0.1 represents an occasional drift of the strategies because of the environmental impact. Or else, individual i keeps his strategy. At each time step, each individual firstly gets his payoff and compares it with the average payoff of the population. If his payoff is less than the average payoff of the population, he updates his project. Or else, he keeps his payoff. Secondly, each individual gets his payoff and compares it with another randomly chosen individual's payoff. If his strategy is different from another individual's strategy, he updates his strategy with probability ω. Or else, he keeps his strategy. The distribution of the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators and the frequencies of cooperators and defectors evolve over time. Figure 1 shows the frequency of cooperators f C as a function of the group size n for different learning mechanisms in project selection. As there is no project selection mechanism, within the range of 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, f C keeps its maximum value of f C ∼ 1. Within the range of 4 < n ≤ 12, f C drops quickly from f C ∼ 1 to f C ∼ 0. Within the range of n > 12, f C keeps its minimum value of f C ∼ 0. For ξ = 0, which corresponds to the situation where all the individuals are mutants in project selection, within the range of 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, f C keeps its maximum value of f C ∼ 1. Within the range of 4 < n ≤ 8, f C has a sharp drop from f C ∼ 1 to f C ∼ 0. Within the range of n > 8, f C keeps its minimum value of f C ∼ 0. For ξ = 1, which corresponds to the situation where all the individuals are imitators in project selection, within the range of 2 ≤ n ≤ 4, f C keeps its maximum value of f C ∼ 1. Within the range of 4 < n ≤ 16, f C has a sharp drop from f C ∼ 1 to f C ∼ 0.38. Within the range of n > 16, f C fluctuates around an intermediate value of f C ∼ 0.38. Such results indicate that the learning mechanism of mutation in project selection is detrimental to cooperation while the learning mechanism of imitation in project selection helps the system reach an intermediate level of cooperation. However, the widespread of cooperation is quite difficult to be reached for the system with a single learning mechanism in project selection. there exist two transition points n (1) tr ∼ 6 and n (2) tr ∼ 10. Within the range of n < n (1) tr , an increase in ξ has no impact on f C and it keeps its maximum value of f C ∼ 1. At the transition point n ∼ n (1)
Simulation results and discussions
tr , f C has a slow increase with the rise of n. At the transition point n ∼ n (2) tr ∼ 10, f C has a sharp drop from f C ∼ 0.88 to f C ∼ 0. Within the range of n > n (2) tr , f C keeps its minimum value of f C ∼ 0. For a larger ξ, the changing tendency of f C vs n is nearly the same as that for ξ = 0.5. The transition point n (1) tr changes little while the transition point n (2) tr increases with the rise of ξ. Figure 3 shows the frequency of cooperators f C as a function of the ratio of imitators ξ for different n. For n = 10, within the range of 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.44, f C keeps its minimum value of f C ∼ 0. At the transition point ξ tr ∼ 0.44, f C increases rapidly from f C ∼ 0 to f C ∼ 0.88. Within the range of 0.48 ≤ ξ < 1, f C firstly increases slowly from f C ∼ 0.88 to f C ∼ 0.93. At the point of 
Figure 4: The time evolution of the frequency of cooperators f C , the average value of project scalesS, the standard deviation of project scales σ s for all the population (a, d, g), the imitators (b, e, h), the mutants (c, f, i) respectively and the ratio of imitators ξ = 0.4 (solid lines), 0.5 (dashed lines), 0.6 (dashed dotted lines). Other parameters are: the total population N = 5000, the multiplication factor r = 5, the group size n = 12, an individual's ability (maximal contribution) C max I =2, the minimum project scale S min =1, the maximum project scale S max =nC max I + 1.
ξ ∼ 1, f C has a sharp drop from f C ∼ 0.93 to f C ∼ 0.85. For a larger n, the changing tendency of f C vs ξ is nearly the same as that for n = 10. An increase in n leads to an increase in the transition point ξ tr and an increase in the maximum value of f C .
The results in fig. 2 and fig. 3 indicate that, within the range where cooperation is quite easy to occur, the project selection mechanism has little impact on the change of cooperation. Within the range where cooperation is quite difficult to occur, the coexistence of mutants and imitators in project selection can effectively promote cooperation.
In order to find out the coevolutionary mechanism between the frequencies of cooperators and the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators, in fig. 4 (a) -(i) we plot the time evolution of the frequency of cooperators, the average value of project scales and the standard devia-tion of project scales for all the population, the imitators and the mutants respectively. Figure 4 (a) shows that, as the ratio of imitators is quite small, the frequency of cooperators firstly has a large fluctuation around f fig. 4 (a) may result from the mutants and the maintenance of a higher level of cooperation in fig. 4 (a) may result from the imitators. For ξ = 0.5, the frequencies of cooperators firstly increase quickly from f C ∼ 0.5 to f C ∼ 0.95 for both the mutants and the imitators. Then, f C decreases from f C ∼ 0.95 to f C ∼ 0.78 for the mutants while f C changes little for the imitators. After that, f C decreases quickly for both the the mutants and the imitators. Such a result indicates that, as more and more mutants become defectors, the imitators are quite difficult to maintain a higher level of cooperation and they become defectors later on. For ξ = 0.6, the frequencies of cooperators firstly increase quickly from f C ∼ 0.5 to f C ∼ 0.95 for both the mutants and the imitators. After that, for the mutants, f C has a subtle decrease from f C ∼ 0.95 to f C ∼ 0.84 and then keeps the value of f C ∼ 0.84 with small fluctuations. For the imitators, f C keeps the value of f C ∼ 0.95 with small fluctuations. Such results indicate that, as most of the imitators are cooperators, the mutants are relatively easier to maintain a higher level of cooperation. Figure 4 (d) and (g) show that the change of f C in fig. 4 (a) is closely related to the change of the scales of the projects selected by the population. Within the range where f C decreases, the average value of the scales of the projects selected by the populationS decreases while the standard deviation σ s of the scales of the projects selected by the population increases. A higher level of cooperation corresponds to a largerS and a smaller σ s .
Comparing the results in fig. 4 (e) and (h) with the results in fig. 4 (f) and (i), we find that the evolution of the scales of the projects selected by the imitators are quite different from the evolution of the scales of the projects selected by the mutants. For the imitators, the evolution ofS is closely related to the evolution of f C . A higher level of cooperation corresponds to a largerS. The evolution of σ s is irrelevant to the evolution of cooperation, which keeps the minimum value of σ s ∼ 0 with an initial drop down. For the mutants, the evolution ofS and σ s lags behind the evolution of f C . For ξ = 0.5, as f C increasesS still decreases with the time. As f C decreases continuouslyS firstly increases and then decreases with the time. A largerS corresponds to a smaller σ s , which indicates that the change in the average value of the scales of the projects selected by the mutants should result from the change in the uniformity of the project scales.
The results in fig. 4 indicate that the improvement of cooperation in the present model should result from the coupling of the evolution of the project scales and the evolution of the individual strategies. As the ratio of imitators is quite small, because most of the mutants adopt the defection strategy, the frequency of cooperators becomes so small that the best project for the imitators should be the small scale project. Therefore, the average scale of the projects selected by the imitators decreases and the change in the project scales lags behind the change in the frequency of cooperators. As the ratio of imitators is quite large, the scattering of the project scales selected by the mutants makes it easier for the imitators to find the most appropriate projects, which leads to a high level of cooperation for the imitators. On the other hand, the widespread of cooperation makes the mutants with a large project earn more, which attracts more mutants to adopt a large project and the average scale of the project selected by the mutants increases. Therefore, for the imitators, the scales of the projects synchronously coevolves with the frequency of cooperators. For the mutants, the evolution of the scales of the projects lags behind the evolution of the frequency of cooperators.
In order to find out the effects of multiple learning mechanisms on the scales of the projects selected by the population in the final steady state, in fig. 5 (a) and (b) we plot the average valueS and the standard deviation σ s of the scales of the projects selected by the population as a function of the ratio ξ of the imitators in the population for different group size n. n, an increase in the ratio of imitators firstly leads to a decrease and then an increase in the project scales. Figure 5 (b) shows that, for n = 10, there exists a transition point ξ tr ∼ 0.45. Within the range of 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.45, σ s firstly has a little increase and then has a little decrease within the range of σ s ∈ [6,6.5]. At the critical point ξ tr ∼ 0.45,S drops fromS ∼ 6 toS ∼ 3.5. Within the range of 0.45 ≤ ξ < 1,S decreases continuously fromS ∼ 3.5 toS ∼ 0. For a larger n, the changing tendency of σ s vs ξ changes little while the critical point ξ tr and the standard deviation σ s increases with the rise of n. Such results indicate that, for a given n, an increase in the ratio of imitators firstly leads to an increase and then a decrease in the project scales.
Comparing the results in fig. 5 with the results in fig. 3 , we find that the levels of cooperation in the present model should be related to the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators. There exists a transition point ξ tr , below which a continuous decrease inS and σ s corresponds to the maintenance of the lowest level of cooperation f C ∼ 0 and above which a continuous increase inS coupled with a continuous decrease in σ s corresponds to the occurrence of a higher level of cooperation.
In order to find out the coupling effects of different learning mechanisms on the evolution of project scales, in fig. 6 (a) and (b) we plot the distributions of the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators respectively. Figure 6 Such results indicate that, as the ratio of imitators is quite small, the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators are both determined by the mutation process, which leads to the occurrence of the situation where nearly all the individuals invest in small projects. As the ratio of imitators is quite large, the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators are both determined by the coupling of the mutation process and the imitation process, which leads to the occurrence of the situation where nearly all the individuals invest in large projects. As all the individuals are imitators, the scales of the projects selected by the individuals are determined by the imitation process, which leads to the scattering of the scales of the dominant projects.
Comparing the results in fig. 5 and fig. 6 with the results in fig. 3 , we find that the occurrence of a higher level of cooperation in the present model is closely related to the occurrence of a larger dominant project. The existence of different learning mechanisms in project selection promotes the occurrence of a larger dominant project, and therefore a higher level of cooperation. , given a group size n, the payoff of the cooperator with a small project may be less than 0, that is, P C = rC I n − C I < 0 on condition that C I ≥ S and r < n. The payoff of the cooperator with an intermediate or a large project may be equal to 0, that is, P C = 0 on condition that C I < S. Therefore, the cooperator with a small project is quite possible to update his project and the numbers of the individuals with different projects become N s = N . With the imitation learning mechanism, all the individuals will adopt a large project. As the ratios of cooperators 
Theoretical analysis

replicator dynamics of the scales of the projects selected by mutants and imitators
equilibrium between the frequencies of cooperators and the scales of the
projects selected by the population Suppose that the system has evolved to the equilibrium state where the cooperators and the defectors coexist. For a given group size n, the averaged payoff of cooperators isP C =
and the averaged payoff of defectors
. In the equilibrium state, the averaged payoffs of cooperators and defectors should be satisfied with the equationP C =P D , that is,
which indicates that the cooperators tend to choose a larger project than the defectors. Consider a typical caseS C =S D + ε, we obtain
The relationship between the frequencies of cooperators and the scales of the projects selected by the cooperators becomes
The above equation indicates that, for a given r, the frequencies of cooperators are related to the scales of the projects selected by the cooperators and the difference between the scales of the projects selected by the cooperators and the defectors. The larger the scale of projects S C , the larger the frequency of cooperators f C . The smaller the difference between S C and S D , the larger the frequency of cooperators f C . Such results are in accordance with the simulation results in fig. 3 and fig. 5 (a) and (b) .
Summary
By incorporating project selection mechanism into the threshold public goods game, we have investigated the coupling effects of mutation and imitation on the evolution of cooperation. As there are more mutants than imitators in the population, the evolution of cooperation is governed by the mutation process, which leads to the suppression of cooperation. As there are more imitators than mutants, the evolution of cooperation is governed by the coupling of the mutation process and the imitation process, which leads to the widespread of cooperation. The suppression or promotion of cooperation in the present model is related to the coevolution of individual strategies and individual preferences. The widespread of cooperation makes the individuals selecting a large project earn more, which attracts more individuals to select large projects and the average value of the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators increases. An increase in the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators makes the individuals with cooperation strategy earn more, which attracts more individuals to adopt cooperation strategy and the frequency of cooperation increases. The low level of cooperation makes the individuals selecting a small project earn a positive return, which attracts more individuals to select small projects and the average value of the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators decreases. A decrease in the scales of the projects selected by the mutants and the imitators makes the individuals with defection strategy earn more, which attracts more individuals to adopt defection strategy and the frequency of cooperation decreases.
In the present work, we have only investigated the role of project selection mechanism in the evolution of cooperation for a homogeneous population. Whether or not the project selection mechanism is beneficial for a heterogeneous population is another challenging issue that deserves further investigation.
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